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这厮认为用威慑能制止住中国武统，真是开玩笑

送交者: new3T 于 2026-09-15 08:18:26

回答: FWIW,陆克文:中国2028年武统台湾的可能性增加由于 2026-09-15 07:41:57

中国如果想武统，没人能制止的住。靠威慑已经吓唬不住中国了

41:41 以后
I\'ve put on the public record before uh in the United States, maybe not here, my view that we have an elevated possibility of military action by the PRC against Taiwan in 28, not by 28, but in 28. and when I say elevated possibility, I do not say probability. and I\'ve used the uh proportionality of one in three. Why have I said that?

One, if you look carefully at China\'s level of uh military preparedness, uh it has gone like this. Two, if you look at China\'s um uh pattern of military and naval exercises, uh these some years ago ceased looking like exercises and began to resemble full-scale dress rehearsals.

thirdly, what worries me most is the possibility of Chinese miscalculation about the degree of American resolve and a conclusion that they may have a unique opportunity before 28 to act. And fourthly, in terms of 28 itself, what concerns me most is the potentiality of the trigger. And that is that in January of 28, we face the next Taiwanese presidential election. the existing democratic progress party led by linger if it\'s reelected will mean four terms of pro-independence DPP government and my concern is the Chinese leadership interpreting that is the tripwire the kazus belli for invoking the anti-cession law of 2005 putting all those factors together which is why I point to elevated risk and leave just to one side Xi Jinping will secure his own reelect at the 21st Party Congress next October for his record fourth term as leader and by then he\'ll be 73 pressing on 74.

That\'s why I\'ve argued the risk factor. What do you do about it? Look, it\'s pretty simple. It\'s called deterrence. Deterrence.

Deterrence. What is deterrence?

Deterrence is a very simple equation. It is causing the other party to conclude that the risk of acting is infinitely greater than the possible advantage to be delivered by that action. And therefore, what is required is a combination of both declaratory and operational policies and strategies by the US and its allies around the world to elevate that risk in the perception of the Chinese leadership. When I\'ve delivered this lecture to US militaries around the US, I usually say it all hangs on that ultimate formula, SMTX.

There\'s usually a pause and Americans take out their pens thinking I got a very clever equation to deliver and you know which you can then take out your slide rule and work out. [clears throat] SMTX equals the shaving mirror test of she which is I\'m having a shave in the morning. I\'m looking in the mirror and you want every day the response in the mirror to be, comrade, it\'s still too risky.

That\'s what deterrence is. That\'s the ultimate equation. Um, in terms of Australian response, our response should simply be to double down with the United States and friends, partners, and allies on the deterrence equation. And as for if deterrence fails, what then to do? I return to my original comment.

It\'s not responsible for anyone who\'s served as prime minister, foreign minister, or ambassadors of United States to engage in hypotheticals. Thank you.

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